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PROPERTY THEORY AND OWNING THE SANDY
SHORE: NO FIRM GROUND TO STAND ON
Robert Thompson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine walking along the dry sand beach and coming to a sign that
says, “Private Beach, No Loitering.”  Probably many readers have shared
this experience, but how many people have stopped and thought, “why is
it a private beach?”  In most states, if the stroller were to ignore the sign
and sit down on the dry sand, she could be forcibly removed and charged
with trespass.  But what is the moral justification for this official use of
force by the State?  Why should the State protect the individual beachfront
property owner’s desire to keep the dry sand beach empty on a day when
numerous members of the public might want to enjoy it?  The obvious
response to these questions is that the beach belongs to the owner because
the owner paid for it and the State protects private investments in property.
That explanation, however, just moves the initial question back one
transaction: that is, why was the beach private when the prior owner sold
it to the present owner?  We really need to go back to the beginning and ask
what the moral justification was for granting private ownership of the sandy
beach in the first place so that the buying and selling could begin.   What
was the moral justification for a property system that ended up excluding
the vast majority of us from the vast majority of beaches?
Many people have probably never considered that theories had to be
developed to justify the private ownership of all land, including beaches.
Since the times of the ancient Greeks, however, the need to justify private
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land ownership has been recognized and debated in Western culture.1
Indeed, the founding fathers of the United States extensively debated
property theories, the rules that each theory could justify, and the type of
society different property rules might produce.2  Property debates often
focus on whether the government is infringing on the rights of the owner,
and not the underlying justifications for ownership and whether the owner’s
actions are in keeping with those justifications.3  Yet, as Michael Heller
points out, uncritical acceptance of private property causes people to fail
to grasp its past and possible future flexibility: “If people thought deeply
about the property they used, perhaps they would see that even the core
meanings are historically contingent and indeterminate.  However, the
everyday perspective on property masks its mysterious character.”4
But then again, even if a particular allocation of property rights is not
questioned and debated in the courts, significant numbers of the public
might refuse to accept or respect it.5  Moreover, Robert Ellickson and
others have pointed out that social norms within a community can be more
important than the formal law in establishing the actual practice of
property.6 One certainly sees this along many beaches.  Where people
decide to walk, sit, fish, and swim seems to be determined more by past
practice and following the examples of others than by the constitutional,
statutory, or case law of the State.  I have argued elsewhere that this
practice is in part attributable to the difficulty of establishing workable
boundaries on coastlines between public and private property.7 Still, I
believe that many people walk where they wish because they question
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whether the beach should be privately owned, even if they never think
about the issue in terms of formal property theory. 
This Article examines the private ownership of the dry sand beach in
terms of the leading moral theories that justify the private ownership of
land.  These theories are: first-in-time, possession, labor theory, personality
theory, and aggregate social utility.  This Article concludes that none of
these theories provides a clearly satisfactory justification for the private
ownership of most beaches.  The search for justifications for private
beaches is important because, as Eric Freyfogle points out, “private
property is a form of state-sanctioned power [and] it is legitimate and
worthy of respect only when it is adequately justified.”8  This Article ends
by suggesting what the absence of a strong moral justification for the
private ownership of dry sand beaches might mean for future policy
options.  The lack of strong moral arguments for private dry sand beaches
can be used to justify different public policies that could expand public
access to the beaches.
II. SOME INITIAL POINTS OF CLARIFICATION
Before discussing the different moral theories for property ownership,
some initial clarifications will be helpful.  This Article is not primarily
about the public trust doctrine, takings law, or other legal doctrines such as
custom, implied dedication, or public easement by prescription.  While all
of these legal doctrines are discussed, they are mostly discussed to show
how a particular moral theory supports or does not support the doctrine
rather than to establish the current state of coastal property law.  Second,
when this Article discusses private ownership of the beach, it is primarily
concerned with the right to exclude the public from using the beach in any
meaningful way.  The right to exclude is key, because a property system
could allow for private ownership of beaches, but also recognize a range of
rights for the public to use and not be excluded from the beach. Later, this
Article discusses some states that have this type of non-exclusive private
ownership of beaches.
Finally, when discussing beaches, this Article primarily will be
discussing what is called the “dry sand beach.”  Currently, the portion of
the beach that is open to the public varies from state to state because states
apply the public trust doctrine and custom differently.  For example,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia use the mean low tide line to
divide the public from the private beach; California, Florida, and Rhode
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Island use the mean high tide line; Hawaii uses the debris line; Texas uses
the natural vegetation line; and in Oregon and New Jersey the public has
access to the dry sand area.9  In most states, however, the public has very
limited rights to the portion of the beach above the mean high tide line.
Most members of the public seem to interpret this dividing line between
public and private property as either the wrack line or the area above the
current swash line, that is, the dry (or often dry) sand beach.  Moreover, if
one were designing a property system for the coastal environment from
scratch, it would make sense to treat the uplands, the dry beach, and the
foreshore separately.
III. DISCUSSION
A.  First-In-Time Theory
1.  The Weakest Moral Theory
Although being first on a public beach can secure you the informal
right to maintain that particular spot for your blanket for the remainder of
the day, can exclusive and permanent private ownership rights to beaches
be justified by a first-in-time theory within which rights are given to the
person who arrived on the beach first?  When discussing the first-in-time
theory with respect to private property generally, Freyfogle quickly
dispenses with this “insubstantial line of reasoning”: 
Only a bit of thinking is needed to see that this claim lacks any real
moral force. For a justification to work, it must explain why the
ownership claims of one person should be honored by others, to the
point of submitting to punishment for failure to do so. Private
ownership almost always benefits the owner; to show that means
little. To justify property, another, tougher question needs
answering: What is in it for the nonowners? Why should they
respect an owner’s claim? First-in-time as a justification provides
no response . . . Mere happenstance, fortuity, or swiftness of foot
can account for a person’s being first, yet none carries moral
weight.10
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2.  An Ahistorical Theory  
Not only is the first-in-time theory morally uncompelling, it fails to
account for the actual history of beaches in the United States.  For example,
when European colonists arrived in New England, Native Americans were
using the shoreline to gather shellfish, catch fish, hunt sea mammals, and
navigate.11  Thus, Native Americans were certainly first-in-time to visit the
beaches.  Yet, as discussed below regarding labor theory, European
colonists in New England did not follow a first-in-time theory because it
would have made it much more difficult to justify seizing property from
Native Americans.  Moreover, even after the colonists had laid claim to the
coastal areas of New England, the beaches often remained open to
communal uses such as gathering seaweed for fertilizer, a right that is still
protected in the Rhode Island Constitution.12
On the West Coast, the case of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay provides
another example of an early history of public use of beaches, rather than
first-in-time private ownership system.13   In Thornton, the Oregon Supreme
Court found that: 
The dry-sand area in Oregon has been enjoyed by the general
public as a recreational adjunct of the wet-sand or foreshore area
since the beginning of the state’s political history. The first
European settlers on these shores found the aboriginal inhabitants
using the foreshore for clam digging and the dry-sand area for their
cooking fires. The newcomers continued these customs after
statehood. Thus, from the time of the earliest settlement to the
present day, the general public has assumed that the dry-sand area
was a part of the public beach, and the public has used the dry-sand
area for picnics, gathering wood, building warming fires, and
generally as a headquarters from which to supervise children or to
range out over the foreshore as the tides advance and recede.14
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Clearly in Oregon, the sand beaches were treated as common property
rather than exclusive private property that a single owner controlled by
being the first person to arrive. 
B.  Possession Theory
1.  Possessing the Grains of Sand
Some property theorists use first-in-time and possession almost
interchangeably; others treat possession as a requirement for being first-in-
time.  For example, explaining the first-in-time theory, Freyfogle states,
“[i]t is the claim that private ownership is justified whenever a person
seizes an unowned thing and becomes its first possessor.”15  So it seems
that even in the first-in-time justification, establishing ownership requires
more than simply showing up first and claiming land.  Freyfogle talks about
“seizing” and becoming the “possessor.”  While one can easily understand
what it means to literally seize or possess personal property, these terms
become metaphorical and more difficult to understand when they are
applied to real property.  One can literally hold a deed to a parcel that states
that he is the owner, but this is not the same as possessing the physical
space.  Moreover, if the deed is legitimate, then some prior actions
conveyed ownership and not the simple act of holding the deed.16  Carol
Rose has argued that establishing possession requires actions that mark the
land and announce to the larger community that one claims ownership of
the land.17 For example, in a number of early California cases, “enclosing”
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the land with fences or some other means was an important factor in
establishing possession.18
Beaches, however, are both literally and conceptually more difficult to
possess in this manner than other land.  As a practical matter, a stormy
ocean can quickly obliterate common boundary markers.  Thus, the markers
would need to be frequently replaced after storms and moved as the beach
profile changes and the boundary between the private beach and the public
trust beach shifts (a process that occurs even in the absence of storms).
Building a seawall or revetment is an alternative option, but requires a good
deal of energy and substantial materials.  In addition, the seawall or revet-
ment might end up encroaching on public property as the beach fluctuates
during the course of the year or migrates over the years.  Possessing a sandy
beach is also conceptually problematic because sediment is always moving
off the beach and being replaced by new sediment.  Even if one were able
to enclose the space with fences, one could not fully control the
unconsolidated shore.  The individual grains of sediment that cumulatively
constitute a beach must continue to move or the beach will cease to exist.19
At least one author has argued that the public should have both the right to
the sand that moves down the longshore current to renourish public beaches
as well as the right to ban structures like groins and seawalls that could
disrupt the sediment flow.20
2.  More Than Just Seizing the Land  
Even assuming that one could physically enclose and seize the dry sand
beach, early cases focusing on prior appropriation suggest that more than
the mere enclosing of land was required to validate an ownership claim. In
Brumagim v. Bradshaw,21 the party claiming ownership by prior
appropriation had built a wall across the end of a coastal peninsula.  While
the court found that the wall, together with the waters of San Francisco
Bay, could combine to technically enclose the peninsula, this was not
enough to establish ownership: 
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which are reasonable uses for a dry sand beach. 19 Cal. 313 (1870).
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The general principle pervading all this class of cases, where the
inclosure consists wholly or partially of natural barriers, is, that the
acts of dominion and ownership which establish a possessio pedis
must correspond, in a reasonable degree, with the size of the tract,
its condition and appropriate use, and must be such as usually
accompany the ownership of land similarly situated.22
Thus, the land must also be used, and used appropriately. 
Land can be used appropriately in two senses: first, the land can seem
naturally well-suited for a use (such as a meadow for grazing); and second,
a use might be valued by the community and, hence, considered
appropriate.  As to the first sense, dry sand beaches are arguably more
appropriately used as public recreation areas than anything else.  This was
the view of the Thornton court:23
Perhaps one explanation for the evolution of the custom of the
public to use the dry-sand area for recreational purposes is that the
area could not be used conveniently by its owners for any other
purpose.  The dry-sand area is unstable in its seaward boundaries,
unsafe during winter storms, and for the most part unfit for the
construction of permanent structures.24
But to address whether land (or in the case of this Article, the beach) is
used appropriately in the second sense, we must look beyond the theories
of first-in-time and possession to other theories that explicitly state values
upon which moral claims may be based. 
C.  Labor Theory
1.  Privatization Through Improvement
In its simplest form, the labor theory of property states that if a person
creates something through his own labor, then that person should own the
thing created.  Thus, the right to own land (at least initially) derives from
working or “improving” the land.  The general argument posited by the
labor theory was widely known and utilized in colonial America.25
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Eighteenth-century philosopher John Locke provided one of the most
influential formulations and defenses of the labor theory.  In Second
Treatise of Government,26 Locke begins his defense of the institution of
private property in land by arguing that every man has a right to his own
body and, thus, to his own labor and the products of that labor: “Though the
Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has
a Property in his own Person.  This no Body has any Right to but himself.
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are
properly his.”27  Moreover, while Locke acknowledges that God gave the
land to everyone as common property, he argues that God certainly wanted
people to mix their labor with the earth to make it more productive: 
God gave the World to Men in Common; but since he gave it them
for their benefit, and the greatest Conveniencies of Life they were
capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should
always remain common and uncultivated.  He gave it to the use of
the Industrious and Rational . . . .28
According to Locke, a man could remove as much land from the commons
as he could productively use: “As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants,
Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property.
He by his Labour does, as it were, inclose from the Common.”29  Thus,
Locke’s labor theory essentially creates the elements for prior
appropriation: one finds land that is unoccupied (or at least inadequately
occupied), encloses it, and improves it with one’s labor. 
2.  The Missing Improvements 
The labor theory does not seem to offer a moral justification for the
private ownership of beaches, because one cannot till, plant, or cultivate the
beach.  Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court opined that:
The beaches of Florida are of such a character as to use and
potential development as to require separate consideration from
other lands with respect to the elements and consequences of title.
The sandy portion of the beaches are of no use for farming,
grazing, timber production, or residency—the traditional uses of
56 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1&2
30. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 1974).
31. 462 P.2d at 673-74.
32. 294 A.2d 47, 48 (N.J. 1972).
33. See generally NORDSTROM, supra note 19, at 155-56; BUSH, et al., supra note 19, at
74-77; DEAN, supra note 19, at 36-68; Todd T. Cardiff, Conflict in the California Coastal
Act: Sand and Seawalls, 38 CAL. W.L. REV. 255, 258-61 (2001).
34. FREYFOGLE, supra note 1, at 26; see also CRONON, supra note 11, at 55-57.
land—but has served as a thoroughfare and haven for fishermen
and bathers, as well as a place of recreation for the public.  The
interest and rights of the public to the full use of the beaches
should be protected.30
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Thornton similarly pointed out that the
custom of public recreational use of the beach probably developed because
the beach was not suitable for structures and other permanent investments.31
This is not to say that people did not labor on the beach.  The court in
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea noted that the
right to dry one’s fishing nets on the beach had existed since Roman
times.32  And as mentioned above, early Rhode Islanders collected seaweed,
and early Oregonians gathered and cooked clams.  While all of this is work,
it is not labor that actually improves the beach. 
Certainly, owners of beachfront property invest in their property and
make improvements as the phrase is commonly understood.  They do so,
however, beyond the beach and not on it.  In fact, when they do
permanently change the beach by building revetments, bulkheads, or
seawalls, they do not improve the beach but instead destroy or degrade it
by disrupting sediment flows, destroying dunes, and so forth.33
One might argue that, even if individual beachfront owners do not
improve the beach itself in a traditional sense, private beach clubs often do
by supplying lifeguards, changing rooms, refreshment stands, and so forth.
While these are certainly facilities and services that many people desire
when visiting a beach and are investments that are entitled to a return, they
are not improvements to the beach itself.  When early Americans thought
about improving the land, they imagined activities like clearing a forest,
removing the rocks, tilling the soil, and producing crops.34  If a
businessman simply brought customers to a forest and served them lunch
and watched over them while they swam in a pond, no one would assert
that the businessman was entitled to the forest because he improved it.
Rather than adding to the value of the forest, the businessman would be
profiting from the preexisting value of the forest, that is, its beauty and its
cool, clear water.  This is the case with the beach as well. 
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Another possible argument is that mechanical beach raking improves
the beach and therefore, the owner who pays for the raking should own the
beach.  There are at least two problems with this view.  First, mechanical
beach raking arguably harms the beach instead of improving it.  Regular
beach grooming reduces the wrack crop and disrupts the food chain,
thereby reducing species diversity on the beach.35  Mechanical beach
cleaning can also eliminate incipient dunes, habitat for nesting birds, seed
sources for pioneer dune colonizers, and food for fauna, thereby reducing
the overall ecological productivity of the dune area.36  Moreover, mechani-
cal grooming can remove sand from the beach, literally reducing its
volume.37  The second problem with this view is that the alleged improve-
ment brought about by beach grooming is rather short-lived.  It is somewhat
analogous to shoveling out a parking spot on a public street after it snows.
In many neighborhoods, the norm is to allow the laborer to have exclusive
use of that space until the next snow storm.  With the next foot of snow, the
product of the labor is eliminated and, along with it, the property claim.
Similarly, more wrack and debris arrive on the beach with every high tide,
rapidly dissipating the benefits of the raking.  Thus, grooming is more of
a service than a property improvement.
3.  Henry George Visits the Beach  
The work of Henry George helps us to better understand the sources of
value in beach property and, thus, better judge the validity of private claims
to that value.  Henry George was a social reformer born in Philadelphia in
1839.  He was keenly interested in understanding why poverty was
increasing in a world where material wealth was increasing.  He believed
that the private ownership of land was a major cause of increasing poverty.
In 1879, George published his highly acclaimed and influential book,
Progress and Poverty, which asserted that all land should be common
58 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1&2
38. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE OF
INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS AND OF  INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH (Modern
Library 1929).
39. See generally id.
40. TIMOTHY BEATLEY, DAVID J. BROWER & ANNA K. SCHWAB, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 2 (2nd ed. 2002).
41. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ocean Facts on Coastal Tourism
(1998), http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/facts/tourism.htm. 
42. See LENA LENfEK & GIDEON BOSKER, THE BEACH: THE HISTORY OF PARADISE ON
EARTH 164-171, 204-215, 223-245 (Viking 1998).
property.38  One of George’s important insights was that as regions and
cities grew, property prices increased, but only part of the increased value
was attributable to labor and other investments of the owner.  Part of the
value came from the fact that the land became surrounded by other valuable
economic activities as the city grew.  Even the landowner who did nothing
to his land could capture part of this growth value.  Another important part
of the value came from scarcity.  As land became more scarce as compared
to demand, its value increased.  Part of Locke’s rationale for allowing the
enclosure of land was the counterfactual assertion that there was plenty and
that scarcity did not exist.  While George agreed with Locke that the owner
should reap the profits from improvements, George argued that scarce land
should remain common property belonging to all people.  He further argued
that the value of any land attributable to its location in a region of economic
growth or to the scarcity of land in that region should be taxed in order to
capture that value and spend it for the public good.39
This argument is even stronger in the context of beaches.  Where does
the value of the beach come from?  First of all, the value comes from the
ocean, which belongs to the public.  Ocean beaches are immense tourist
attractions.  More than 180 million people visit the United States coast each
year, making it the number one recreational destination in the United
States.40  More than ninety percent of foreign tourists to the United States
visit its coast.41  If one goes to the great inland sand dunes of California or
New Mexico, one does not see hordes of people sunning themselves on
beach chairs or blankets—even on the nicest of days.  It is the ocean that
draws the visitors.  The place to swim, the sound of the waves, the smell of
the breeze, the infinite vistas, and the coolness of the air are all elements
that add value to the beach.  Why should the owner of a private beach be
able to charge the public to enjoy a value that comes from the public’s
ocean and not from the beach owner’s efforts? 
Of course, scarcity is also an important part of the value of beach
property.  The popularity of the beach has continued to increase for over a
century,42 and both the permanent and seasonal coastal populations will
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continue to grow in the future.43  But the increasing popularity of the beach
would not have been possible without a tremendous public investment in
infrastructure such as highways, bridges, and sewage treatment plants.  C.
Ford Runge et al. have pointed out that the public, not just the private
owner, should benefit from the increase in property values that these types
of public investments create.44  What moral argument justifies the private
owner capturing the value of this increased demand that is in large part
attributable to public expenditures?
4.  Charging for Services and Not the Value of the Beach  
Over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has
developed a modern interpretation of the public trust doctrine that
corresponds very closely to the above Georgian analysis of beaches.  In
Borough of Neptune City45 the court held that, under the public trust
doctrine, the public had rights in tidal lands “to recreational uses, including
bathing, swimming and other shore activities.”46
Later, in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,47 the court
considered the extent of the public’s interest in privately-owned dry sand
beaches.  The Matthews court held that the public’s interest included the
right to cross privately-owned beaches to gain access to the foreshore and
the right to sunbathe and generally enjoy recreational activities on the dry
sand.48  It reasoned that swimming “must be accompanied by intermittent
periods of rest and relaxation beyond the water’s edge” and, if the dry sand
was not available for this purpose, the unavailability “would seriously
curtail and in many situations eliminate the right to the recreational use of
the ocean.”49  The court also noted that New Jersey’s beaches were a
“unique” and “irreplaceable” resource, which was subject to ever
increasing pressure due to population growth and improved transportation
to the seashore.50
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Recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Raleigh Ave. Beach
Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club51 reaffirmed the public’s right to utilize
privately owned beaches.  Even though the Raleigh court reaffirmed that
the private beach club could not exclude the public from the beach, or
charge them a fee to access it, the court did allow the beach club to charge
a fee for lifeguards, restrooms, and other services, but provided that the
state’s Department of Environmental Protection would determine what a
reasonable fee would be based in part on the experience at state beaches.52
So, in keeping with Henry George’s analysis of land value, the New Jersey
Supreme Court allowed the owners to receive a return on the services that
they provided, but not to capture the value created by the ocean or scarcity.
5.  Spoilage and Underutilization
As mentioned above, a major element of the moral argument for
allowing individuals to claim private ownership of land is that the land will
be used productively.  In Locke’s work, and in early American political
thinking, this productive use requirement created two limitations on what
one could claim for private property: no person could claim more land than
he could productively use or accumulate more of its fruits than he could use
without spoilage.53  Although beaches do not spoil or waste away in the
same way that apples or lumber can, one can spoil, waste, or destroy a
beach by erecting coastal defenses that disrupt sediment movement and
other coastal processes.54  It seems morally indefensible to award private
ownership of beaches to individuals only to allow them to destroy the
resource.
The underutilization of private beaches also raises moral questions.
The thinking of Locke and other like-minded philosophers caused early
Americans to be suspicious of private claims to vacant or underutilized
land:
[M]any New Englanders questioned whether a person could claim
full property rights in vacant, undeveloped land.  Such land was
not the same as other land, many believed; until tilled or enclosed
it remained a shared asset, subject to public use and control.
Wildness and lack of cultivation were also evidence that a land
parcel’s owner did not need the land for subsistence.  This, too,
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was an issue under natural-rights reasoning, for a family could
morally claim only as much land as it needed and could use.
Private claims in vast, little-used tracts were morally suspect,
particularly when the owner acquired title directly from the state
at a trivial cost.55
Consequently, New Englanders considered privately owned woodlands to
be open for recreation, hunting, and foraging.56
But what does a past view of the immorality of underutilizing property
suggest about the contemporary morality of private beach ownership?
Owners of private beach clubs do utilize their beaches daily (at least during
the season), and provide services for which they should be paid.  However,
beaches fronting many private homes are grossly underutilized.  Many
beach communities have extremely large numbers of second homes and
vacation rentals.57  While every beach community is different, it is not
uncommon in my community58 for beachfront homes to be unoccupied
during most of the year and even on many summer days.  Moreover, even
when the homes are occupied, the owners are actually using very little of
the sandy beach for very little of the day.  In any case, it seems undeniable
that private beaches are typically grossly underutilized when compared to
nearby public beaches.  Is it morally defensible that private beaches that
nature has created should lie unused while public beaches are overused?59
To put the question another way, if our forebears had foreseen the public’s
growing interest in, and pressure on, the nation’s beaches, would they have
intentionally designed a system that gives the vast majority of the sandy
beaches to relatively few private owners and that thereby confines the vast
majority of Americans to comparatively tiny pockets of state and federally
owned beaches?
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6.  Trespass as a Means of Questioning the Legitimacy of Ownership
One of the interesting observations about behavior and beaches when
it comes to property theory is that people’s behavior often indicates that
they do not fully accept the legitimacy of privately owned beaches.  As
Jean Ensminger explains, the lack of self-enforcement can be a sign of a
property system that is considered illegitimate:
The structure of property rights always has distributional conse-
quences. In any given society those who find such distribution
culturally acceptable, that is, consistent with their values concern-
ing the just distribution of rewards, may voluntarily comply with
the norms that enforce such institutions.  In other words, they self-
enforce, or comply with rules even when they could get away with
breaking them.  Voluntary compliance with social norms forms the
backbone of society.60
I have lived on both the east and west coasts and have been intrigued
to see people on both sides of the continent fail to comply with standard
property norms on the beach. Many of the locals in my current coastal
community trespass on the property of seasonal residents with impunity,
particularly during the off-season.  When I discuss this with local residents,
they do not sound like criminals, trespassing whenever they think they can
get away with it.  Instead, the trespassers I have spoken with essentially feel
that a property right allowing a nonresident owner to exclude local
residents from an unused beach is somehow immoral and unworthy of
respect.  Perhaps this is a rationalization that allows them to simply do what
they want, but even if it is a rationalization, it is one that probably would
not work as well away from the beach.
In fact, beaches appear prominently in the case law where people who
are not the owners of record assert the right to use property through either
the theory of implied dedication or public easement by prescription.61  A
particularly interesting aspect of this litigation is the willingness of
members of the public to take the law into their own hands, physically
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defying the owner’s claims to a right to exclude.  Consider the experience
of the Kings, property owners who tried to stop public access to what they
considered their private beach:
In 1960, a year after the Kings acquired the land, they placed a
large timber across the road at the entrance to their land. Within
two hours it was removed by persons wishing to use the beach.
Mr. King occasionally put up No Trespassing signs, but they were
always removed by the time he returned to the land, and the public
continued to use the beach until August 1966.  During that month,
Mr. King had another large log placed across the road at the
entrance to his property.  That barrier was, however, also quickly
removed.  He then sent in a caterpillar crew to permanently block
the road.  That operation was stopped by the issuance of a tempor-
ary restraining order.62
Similarly, in Concerned Citizens v. Holden Beach Enterprises, sun-
bathers and fishermen battled a landowner for over twenty years to keep a
path open to the shoreline.63  People tore down “No Trespassing” signs and
used them for firewood, destroyed gates and fences, and simply drove past
a security guard in a guardhouse.64  It is difficult to imagine cases occurring
further inland where members of the community would so tenaciously
engage in what was potentially trespassing and vandalism.  
D.  Personality Theory
The personality theory justifies the private ownership of property as
being necessary for the full development of the individual.  The personality
theory conceives of at least three different explanations for private
property.  The first is that property is needed for subsistence and physical
security.  People cannot flourish if they are hungry, cold, and insecure.
However, while people today certainly fish and gather shellfish along the
beach, it probably rarely plays a role in subsistence. The second argument
is that property that is closely connected to the talents and personality of
the individual is necessary for that person’s full development.  For instance,
a great cellist can only become a great cellist if she has a cello from an
early age so that she can fully develop her natural talent. Arguably she has
to have a secure property interest in the cello to feel secure enough to
devote her life to the cello.  A problem with this second argument is that it
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is hard to know what kinds of property are necessary to allow different
individuals to fully develop or even whether an individual has failed to
develop to his potential.  While a pleasant time on the beach might help
anyone develop into a happier person, it is difficult to imagine how the
talents and personalities of beachfront property owners are closely tied to
the beach in this developmental way.65
The third argument concerns the notion that psychological security and
privacy are necessary if one is to fully develop and prosper in life.  Both
American trespass law and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
protects the privacy of the individual, particularly in relation to activities
within the home.66  At first glance, this version of the personality theory
seems to have merit.  In conflicts over beach access, beachfront owners
often complain that the people using the beach do not respect their
privacy.67  In such cases, the homeowners often argue that in order to
protect their privacy it is necessary not only to reserve the dry sand beach,
but also to restrict lateral public access along the waterline.  However, a
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moral theory based on privacy cannot be based on a purely personal
expectation of privacy.  Instead, the expectation of privacy must be one that
society is willing to recognize as reasonable.68  Thus, one needs to ask
whether the beachfront owners’ expectations of privacy are reasonable and
worthy of societal respect; specifically, to what degree should the dry sand
beaches be held privately, and should those private owners be able to
exclude the rest of the public?
The longstanding common law rule in England and the United States
is that property owners cannot prevent other people from looking onto their
property: “the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.”69
Still, social norms discourage people from engaging in voyeuristic abuses.
In the case of beachfront property, however, it appears that it is not the
beach strollers who are abusing the situation, but the property owners.  The
shoreline property owners do not have any reasonable expectation of
privacy on the dry sand beach itself because it is flat, open, and readily
observable from both the public trust beach and boats on the ocean.
Moreover, even if shorefront residents feel that their privacy is being
invaded in their homes, their perceived lack of privacy is often due to their
own choices.  For example, shorefront homes often have numerous
windows on the ocean side in order for the owners to have expansive views
of the public’s ocean.  Of course, architectural designs that are good for
looking out make it easy for the rest of the world to look in.  But it hardly
seems reasonable to ban the public from the dry sand beach simply because
the beachfront owners installed big windows to enjoy the aesthetic benefits
of the public’s ocean.
Furthermore, the problem is not only how owners build, but also where
they build.  If shorefront owners were more responsible, they would build
their homes up and well back from the dry sand beach to protect them from
storm damage, but instead they often build them dangerously close to — or
even on—the beach.70  When owners build on or beyond the frontal dune,
homes are eventually destroyed and damaged and the public too often ends
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up paying for a sizable amount of the storm damage.71  If coastal homes
were built in truly safe locations, then it would be very difficult to observe
activities within those homes from the dry sand beach.  In the end, all of the
variations of the personality theory, including privacy, offer very weak
moral arguments to support the private ownership of dry sand beaches.
E.  Aggregate Social Utility Theory
The aggregate social utility theory is grounded in utilitarianism.  As
Frederik Kaufman explains: “[u]tilitarians begin with an account of what
is good—pleasure (or happiness) according to the classical utilitarians—
and then define as right those actions that produced as much good as
possible in a particular situation.”72  Thus, in the words of John Stuart Mill,
one of the fathers of utilitarianism:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend
to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the
privation of pleasure.73
Utilitarianism is largely a consequentialist moral philosophy, that is, it
conceives of right and wrong solely according to the consequences of
actions and not the intrinsic features of the actions themselves.  The
morality of an action is judged by its outcome; hence, the action that is
morally correct is one that creates the greatest aggregate level of social
utility. 
Freyfogle asserts that utilitarianism is the dominant moral justification
for private property ownership in the United States:
Private property exists and is legitimate because of the overall
utility it generates for society as a whole. With reasonably secure
rights, a person can plant in the spring confident that she can
harvest in the fall; as she plants and harvests, she adds to the
overall stock of food. Homes will be built, farms cleared, canals
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dug, factories built, all because secure rights encourage owners to
make long-term investments.74
Although arguments based on the aggregate social utility or labor theories
at times tend to run together, the moral right in the latter comes from
investing one’s labor (or labor that one has purchased) in the land, while
the moral right in the former comes from creating a system that yields the
greatest good.
But how do we know whether an assignment of property rights creates
the greatest happiness when we have no way of measuring happiness?  As
Timothy Beatley explains, for many, the free market provides an easy
solution to this seemingly difficult problem:
While there is an active debate over how to define or conceive of
utility or welfare, for many the question is easily resolved through
reliance on private markets.  Through market mechanisms it is up
to each individual to determine his or her own preferences or life
plans and to pursue them accordingly—that is, through one’s
“dollar votes.”  The market model is viewed . . . as the most effec-
tive social mechanism by which to achieve the utilitarian ethic.75
While a great deal has been written about the shortcomings of market
mechanisms and potential ways for dealing with them, one does not have
to delve into most of them to answer the question of whether private
ownership of dry sand beaches can be justified by the aggregate social
utility theory.76  The prominent question is whether this property
arrangement creates the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Certainly owning a nice sandy beach creates a good deal of happiness in the
owner—a fact to which the real estate prices of beachfront property attest.
Still, we have to ask what is in it for the rest of society, particularly in light
of Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle, which states that the happiness of
everyone matters.  One argument would be that the “dollar votes” have
been counted and the owner of the beach, by bidding the most for the
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property, has assured that the beach is being put to its best use—that is, the
one that will create the greatest utility. 
One of the dangers of blindly relying on market measures of utility is
that inequalities in wealth can greatly skew estimates of utility.77  Simply
put, initial allocations of wealth skew future distributions of wealth and
hence utility.  When it comes to the distribution of the Nation’s beaches,
utilitarianism seems to fall flat on its face. If most of the country is crowded
onto a small fraction of the nation’s beaches while the large majority of the
beaches fall under the control of increasingly wealthy people, how does this
serve the greatest aggregate good? 
Beaches provide a striking example of how money can be an
astoundingly poor substitute for measuring utility. While the people sitting
isolated on their private beaches may have more wealth than all of the
thousands of visitors crowded onto a nearby public beach, it seems difficult
to argue that restricting access to the private stretch of beach to the private
owners creates greater total happiness than allowing the thousands of
people crammed onto the public beach to spread themselves out along the
shoreline. One might argue that if this is the case, then the state should buy
the stretch of beach and, as I will argue later, perhaps the state should.  But
this misses the point: saying that the state can buy the beach back is simply
not a moral justification for allowing the private ownership of the beach in
the first place. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Even if there are no moral theories to justify the initial establishment
of private, exclusive ownership of dry sand beaches, one could argue that
most states now consider dry sand to be fair game for private ownership
with the right to exclude, thus creating  moral, political, and legal dilemmas
that cannot be ignored.  While this is the current understanding in most
states, the foregoing analysis showing the absence of moral justifications
should not be a purely academic exercise.  It should instead encourage
those who are concerned about access to the dry sand to do something to
rectify this misallocation of resources.  This Article closes by offering three
strategies.
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A.  Establish the Actual Historic Use
Rose has noted that property theorists often use narratives to support
their theories, but that these narratives are often not grounded in fact.78  It
is quite possible that if one reconstructed the history of use of the dry sand
beach along the American coast, it would not be a story of exclusive private
ownership in the dry sand beach, but instead largely a story of common use.
The extension—or at least the enforcement—by courts of a private right to
exclude the public from the dry sand beach seems to be a relatively recent
development and one that has not always been recognized by the public. In
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, the court recognized this disconnect
between relatively recent rulings concerning ownership of the beach and
actual practice on the beach:
Although the early cases did not distinguish between dry sand and
wet sand areas, this court has noted that the distinguishing line was
considered to be “the ‘high-water’ line, a line that was then
assumed to be the vegetation line.” It was not until 1935 that the
United States Supreme Court redefined this boundary as extending
to the mean high-tide line [in Borax Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S.
10 (1935)]. This court has noted that, although Borax “may have
expanded seaward the record ownership of upland landowners, it
was apparently little noticed by Oregonians . . . [and] had no
discernible effect on the actual practices of Oregon beachgoers and
upland property owners.”79
Although some have criticized the Stevens court for its interpretation of
custom,80 the actual use of the dry sand is essential to determining the
property rights to which the public actually consented.
Presently, some states recognize various customary rights of access and
use of the beach (e.g., Texas, Florida, Oregon, and Hawaii), while other
states have rejected the doctrine (e.g., Georgia, Maryland, and Maine).81
But even if the courts in a state decline to apply the doctrine of custom, a
clearly documented history of public use in specific places could establish
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a right to public use under the theories of implied dedication or public
easement by prescription.  If a history of public use sufficient to establish
a public easement by prescription was shown to exist, it would prove that
the public did not accept that there was an adequate moral argument to
justify a private right to exclude the public.
B.  Taking it Outright
Even if a current public right to use the dry sand beach cannot be
established through custom, implied dedication, or prescription, this does
not mean that such a right cannot be created.  In other words, if the dry sand
beaches have been misallocated to private owners, state governments
should legislatively establish a public right to use the dry sand or simply
establish public ownership over the dry sand.  Of course, this would
constitute a legislative taking of private property for which compensation
must be paid.  At first glance, the cost would seem to be enormous. After
all, this is beachfront property and it is worth a tremendous amount of
money.  However, a closer examination suggests that the cost may not be
very high at all.  First of all, the owners would be left with the entire
buildable portion of their lots.  They would also be left with their beautiful
views, although the beach portion might be more cluttered with people.
Still, the owners would retain a great deal of value in their property. 
Moreover, it is not clear that opening the beaches to the public would
reduce the market value of shorefront property substantially.  Buyers might
be willing to pay a lot more money for a private beach, but there would no
longer be private beaches available in the state.  It is conceivable that the
demand curve would not change much, particularly if potential buyers are
unwilling or unable to go to another state to buy a private beach.  One of
the interesting facts in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission was that
while the Nollans felt the need to sue the State of California when it
conditioned a building permit on a requirement to provide a public
easement across their beach, forty-three other property owners in the same
subdivision, subject to the same requirement, did not sue.82  In fact, Justice
Brennan stated in his dissent that “[the Nollans] can make no tenable claim
that either their enjoyment of their property or its value is diminished by
the public’s ability merely to pass and repass a few feet closer to the
seawall beyond which appellants’ house is located.”83
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Of course, in Nollan the easement only allowed the public to pass
across the beach and not to linger.84  However, as we saw in Raleigh Ave.
Beach Ass’n the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the public does
indeed have a right to linger on the dry sand beach pursuant to the public
trust doctrine.85  Consequently, New Jersey provides a test case to see the
extent to which allowing public access to the dry sand will lower
beachfront property prices.  If beachfront property values are not markedly
lowered by the Raleigh court’s ruling, then other states should feel
emboldened to legislatively condemn the right to exclude, and thereby
reopen the beaches to the public.
C.  The Transfer Tax
If a state is unwilling to establish public use rights or ownership over
all of its dry sand beaches outright, it might still be willing to take more
conservative steps to purchase beaches incrementally.  The funds for these
purchases could come from a transfer tax on all sales of beachfront
property.  As discussed above, the value of beachfront property comes from
the ocean and not the efforts of the owner. Thus, in the tradition of Henry
George, beach communities should establish a real estate transfer tax on all
sales of beachfront property to recapture some of the natural value of the
property.  Those revenues can then be used to buy more beach, thereby
creating greater opportunities for the public to enjoy that natural value.  In
recent decades, the value of beachfront property has increased dramatically,
so even a low tax rate could generate sizable income.  Moreover, if the state
or community primarily purchased beach rights rather than entire parcels,
the money could be spread over a longer stretch of shoreline. 
While these suggestions may strike many as controversial, they should
not.  What is truly controversial is the present system which excludes the
vast majority of Americans from the vast majority of the nation’s dry sand
beaches.  It is important to lay bare the absence of a clear moral grounding
for the present system.  If we accept that the present system is morally
unjustifiable, then political resistance to correcting this misallocation of
property rights might be reduced.  After all, property is a form of state-
sanctioned power, and if the exercise of that power is unjustifiable in a
particular setting—such as on dry sand beaches—then the state should use
its power to rectify the problem instead of perpetuating it.

